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Abstract: This paper discusses Oppenheimer's theory on marriage timing, reviews the way this 
theory was received in European demography and family sociology, and develops a new test of 
the theory using annual panel data from 13 European countries for the period 1994-2001. Several 
indicators of men's economic status are used, including school enrolment, employment, type of 
labor contract, work experience, income, and education. Effects of these indicators are estimated 
for the transition to marriage and cohabitation, as well as for the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage. Country differences in these effects are examined as well. The evidence provides 
strong support for the male breadwinner hypothesis on the one hand, and for Oppenheimer's 
career uncertainty hypothesis on the other hand. However, the relevance of these hypotheses also 
depends on the national context, and especially on the way gender roles are divided in a society. 
 
Keywords: marriage, cohabitation, education, employment, income, Europe 
 
 
 
 
L’impact du niveau de revenu et du travail des hommes sur le mariage et la cohabitation : 
la théorie d’Oppenheimer testée en Europe 
 
Dans cet article relatif à la théorie d’Oppenheimer sur le calendrier du mariage, nous examinons 
la manière dont cette théorie a été perçue par la démographie européenne et la sociologie de la 
famille et nous testons à nouveau cette théorie à l’aide de données de panel annuel collectées 
dans 13 pays européens au cours de la période 1994-2001.  Différents indicateurs du statut 
économique de l’homme sont utilisés, tels que la scolarisation, l'emploi, le type de contrat de 
travail, l’expérience professionnelle, le revenu et le niveau d’instruction. Les effets de ces 
indicateurs sont estimés pour l’entrée dans le mariage ou la cohabitation, ainsi que pour le 
passage de la cohabitation au mariage. Les différences entre pays des  effets de ces indicateurs 
sont également examinées. Les résultats appuient fortement l’hypothèse de l'homme en tant que 
soutien économique de la famille d’une part, et d’autre part l’hypothèse d’instabilité 
professionnelle d’Oppenheimer.  Cependant, la pertinence de ces hypothèses dépend  également 
du contexte national, et plus spécialement de la répartition des rôles selon le genre dans la société 
étudiée.  
 
Mots clés : mariage, cohabitation, instruction, emploi, revenu, Europe
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To the memory of Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer
1
 
 
 
Bringing men back in 
 
The American demographer and sociologist Valerie Oppenheimer wrote a series of influential 
papers in which she emphasized the role of men’s socioeconomic position in demographic 
change, in particular in the declining rates of marriage and the underlying tendency to 
increasingly postpone and perhaps even forego marriage (Oppenheimer 1988, 2000, 2003; 
Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Lim 1997). In this contribution, I review Oppenheimer’s original 
theoretical work, I discuss how her work held up in empirical research in Europe, and I provide a 
new test of the theory for the European setting. In doing so, I try to resolve some remaining gaps 
in the empirical literature and I evaluate whether the theory is equally valid in the different 
countries that make up the European context. Given the recent economic crisis in the US and in 
Europe, and the growing concerns about economic inequality, the influence of men’s economic 
position on marriage and family formation remains a vital concern. 
At the time Oppenheimer began writing her papers on how men’s economic position 
influenced marriage formation—in the late 1980s and early 1990s—this was generally not a 
popular idea. The declining rates of marriage and increasing rates of divorce were typically 
conceptualized in terms of an ‘erosion of marriage.’ This erosion was explained in two different 
ways. One theory looked for the culprit in the growing economic role of women in society. This 
theory was voiced by demographers and economists working from a micro-economic perspective 
(Becker 1981; Espenshade 1985; Farley 1988), although, as Oppenheimer noted (1988, p. 575), 
it bore a strong resemblance to classic sociological theories formulated by functionalists like 
                                                 
1
 Valerie Oppenheimer passed away November 2, 2009. 
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Talcot Parsons (Parsons 1949). The explanation basically argued that more symmetrical 
economic roles of men and women would lead to a decline in the gains to marriage, or to put it in 
Parsonian terms, would undermine marital solidarity. 
The second explanation argued that the decline of marriage was related to value change, 
and in particular to the increasing need for individual autonomy on the one hand, and the 
ideological condemnation of traditional institutions like marriage on the other. This second 
perspective was expressed most strongly by European demographers like Lesthaeghe and Van de 
Kaa although it was also used by influential American demographers at the time (Bumpass 1990; 
Rindfuss and Van den Heuvel 1990). In their Second Demographic Transition theory, 
Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa argued that ideological change in combination with secularization 
was driving not only the postponement of marriage, but also the increase in cohabitation, the rise 
in divorce, and the decline of fertility (Lesthaeghe 1983; Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986; 
Lesthaeghe and Surkuyn 1988; Van de Kaa 1987). While the first explanation saw the engine of 
the demographic transition in economic change, the second emphasized the primacy of cultural 
change. Both theories, however, were pessimistic about the future of marriage: the economic 
perspective saw marriage as incompatible with symmetrical gender roles, the second saw it as 
incompatible with individualistic values. 
 While there was considerable debate between proponents of economic and cultural 
explanations, Oppenheimer criticized both perspectives. First, she questioned the empirical 
evidence for the theories. For example, she noted that there were no signs of a so-called 
independence effect. Women with attractive economic resources were not less likely to enter 
marriage, as would be predicted from the micro-economic perspective (Oppenheimer and Lew 
1994). Although women’s employment and education had an effect on fertility and divorce, this 
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did not appear to be the case for marriage timing (Oppenheimer 1997). Oppenheimer also had 
empirical critique on the cultural perspective. When looking at simple descriptive statistics on 
what people want for themselves—on people’s hopes and desires—she noted that the majority of 
both single men and women still wanted to be married (Oppenheimer 1994). The anti-marriage 
ideology may have existed in feminist circles or in the pop culture of the sixties, but it had not 
spread to a larger audience in the way that, for example, egalitarian gender norms had done.  
Oppenheimer also had theoretical criticisms of the two explanations (Oppenheimer 1994, 
1997). First, she believed that the theories were basically about nonmarriage and not about 
delays in marriage. As other demographers also had observed, the declining marriage rate was 
primarily driven by increases in the age at marriage, and not so much by a decline in the 
proportion of persons who marry eventually, although this latter could of course not yet be 
observed in the late 1980s. Oppenheimer believed that people were postponing marriage, not 
foregoing it. This seems by and large correct now, although the proportions every marrying 
among the lower educated in the US did appear to decline (Goldstein and Kenney 2001). A 
second part of her theoretical critique was against the micro-economic model of specialization. 
Quoting historical demographic work, Oppenheimer noted that wives in the past had always 
worked for pay when circumstances required this. Wives worked to make ends meet when the 
husband was not making enough money, when he was unemployed, or when household costs 
were temporarily pressing (Oppenheimer 1982). Oppenheimer argued that specialization in 
marriage is an inflexible and risky strategy in many different societal contexts. If marriage was 
not based on a model of full specialization in the more distant past, Oppenheimer argued, why 
would it then cease to exist in the modern era in which wives began to work? 
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Oppenheimer not only criticized the then dominant perspectives on demographic change, 
she also presented an alternative. Her own explanation can be placed in the economic rather than 
the cultural camp, but it was different in that it focused on men rather than women. During the 
1980s and 1990s, young men’s economic position in the United States had deteriorated quickly, 
especially for those with little schooling. In the poor and uncertain economic prospects of young 
men, Oppenheimer saw an important potential for understanding the decline of marriage. 
Because the earlier explanation had focused more on women—especially through arguments 
about women’s economic independence—one could say that Oppenheimer was in fact ‘bringing 
men back into the debate.’ She did this in two different ways. 
First, she reinstated older Malthusian ideas about the economic costs of marriage (Hajnal 
1965; Bernard 1976; Easterlin 1980). Because setting up and running a household cost money, 
men unable to fulfill the role of breadwinner will not be attractive marriage partners and fathers. 
Oppenheimer recognized that this traditional male-breadwinner hypothesis may have lost some 
of its force when gender roles become more symmetrical. Nonetheless, she argued that it would 
also be naive to expect men’s economic resources to become unimportant in influencing 
marriage prospects: this would be ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater.’ 
The second way in which she brought men back in the debate was through her 
uncertainty hypothesis (Oppenheimer 1988). The argument is that unstable careers, as indicated 
by low-status jobs, nonemployment, and irregular and temporary employment, signal 
uncertainty. This uncertainty applies not only to whether the husband will be able to provide in 
the future, but also to the type of life he will lead. Work structures the lifestyle a person will 
develop, and when men have not yet settled in their career it is difficult to predict what married 
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life will be like. In this way, employment uncertainty impedes assortative mating and may 
therefore delay marriage. 
An important difference between the breadwinner and the uncertainty hypotheses is that 
the former focuses primarily on the financial aspects of employment whereas the latter is also 
concerned with its social consequences. An implication is that the neo-Malthusian argument 
would be fully covered by effects of income, whereas the uncertainty argument would also be 
reflected in indicators like irregular attachment to the labor market, the amount of work 
experience, career trajectories, and temporary employment. In a separate paper, Oppenheimer 
also developed and operationalized the concept of a stopgap job, i.e., a job that is not a reflection 
of an employee’s educational credentials and that is meant as temporary by both employer and 
employee (Oppenheimer and Kalmijn 1995). Men in such stopgap jobs would postpone marriage 
because they are not settled in their career and therefore cannot yet make a suitable match in the 
marriage market. 
Compared to the other two perspectives, Oppenheimer’s theory has a more optimistic 
implication for the future of marriage. The prevailing explanations were rather pessimistic about 
the future of marriage—after all, female labor force participation was unlikely to decline in the 
future and individualism did not appear to be receding. In Oppenheimer’s theory, the economic 
position of young men largely depends on macro-economic conditions. Because unemployment 
rates tend to have cyclical rather than linear trend patterns, the economic position of young men 
could improve and this would then have positive repercussions for marriage. Moreover, the 
theory only implies the postponement of marriage until men accumulate more work experience 
and become settled in their career, and not an erosion of the institution of marriage, as the other 
theories seem to imply. 
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Oppenheimers explanation had a second attractive feature: it could also explain another 
important demographic trend, namely the rise in cohabitation (Oppenheimer 2003). 
Oppenheimer argued that a man’s failure to provide economically would be less of a problem for 
cohabitation than for marriage. For many couples, cohabitation is a trial stage before marriage 
and it may be that uncertainty about a young man’s position is more tolerable during the 
cohabiting stage than it would be for a long-term commitment to marriage. Assuming that the 
costs of breaking up a cohabiting union are lower, cohabitation can therefore provide a way for 
couples to reduce uncertainty about future career prospects. In a sense, Oppenheimer argued that 
a cultural innovation like cohabitation before marriage (on a massive scale) was the outcome of 
economic needs rather than the result of ideological change. In line with this, other authors even 
argued that cohabitation is a rational response to uncertainty: a flexible partnership well-suited 
for a flexible labor market (Mills, Blossfeld and Klijzing 2005). 
In the United States, many studies have tested Oppenheimer’s theory. American research 
generally supports the view that poor economic prospects for men are associated with a delay in 
marriage. This has been demonstrated for a range of indicators, including employment per se, 
unstable employment, low earnings, and other indicators of career ‘immaturity’ (Clarkberg 1999; 
Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart and Landry 1992; Lloyd and South 1996; Mare and Winship 
1991; Oppenheimer 2003; Oppenheimer et al. 1997; Sassler and Schoen 1999; Smock and 
Manning 1997; Sweeney 2002; Xie, Raymo, Goyette and Thornton 2003). There is also evidence 
in the United States that cohabitation is less strongly influenced by men’s economic position than 
marriage, although there is no clear reverse income effect, i.e., that the poor are being selected 
into cohabiting unions. Furthermore, in the United States, the income effect on marriage timing 
appears to be stable over time. Sweeney (2002) compared two cohorts in the US and found that 
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in the cohort marrying during the 1980s and 1990s, men’s income had an equally strong positive 
effect on the entry into marriage as in the cohort marrying during the 1960s and 1970s (Sweeney 
2002). 
 
Testing the theory in Europe 
 
In this paper, I develop a new test of Oppenheimer’s theory for the European context. There are 
several reasons to expect Oppenheimer’s theory to also apply to Europe. First, the demographic 
trends that occurred in Europe were similar, although sometimes less dramatic and sometimes 
occurring later. The age at marriage has risen, the rate of marriage has declined, and cohabitation 
has increased as well (Kiernan 2002; Lesthaeghe 1983; Van de Kaa 1987). Second, many 
European countries experienced economic problems that were similar to those in the United 
States. They were especially salient for outsiders on the labor market, such as young adults, 
ethnic minorities, and women. Several authors argued that partly in response to economic 
globalization, young European men (and women) faced increasing levels of economic 
uncertainty in their transition from school to work (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills and Kurz 2005). In 
many European countries, especially in Southern Europe, levels of youth unemployment were 
even higher than in the United States, a phenomenon which has often been linked to the higher 
degrees of employment protection in Europe (Müller and Gangl 2003; Nickell 1997). 
There are also reasons to believe that the theory would be less applicable to Europe. One 
counter argument lies in the role of the welfare state. In several European societies, and 
particularly in social-democratic welfare states like Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
social security is more generous and more universally provided than it is in the United States 
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(Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 1993). This means that in many European countries, 
young men receive unemployment benefits when they are out of work. Moreover, for those who 
have never worked, basic welfare is provided, albeit at a minimum level. As a result, young 
jobless men can still bear the cost of setting up a household. Following the neo-Malthusian 
argument, it could thus be argued that employment problems do not per se lead to marriage 
postponement in Europe. A rebuttal of this point is that Oppenheimer’s argument about 
uncertainty and assortative mating, which is not only about money, but also about stability and 
predictability, could still apply to Europe. A young man who is on unemployment benefits 
remains an uncertain candidate on the marriage market even if he has the financial means to 
support a household at that point in time. 
Another important difference between the American and the European case lies in the 
degree of heterogeneity. Although the US is certainly not a homogeneous country—there are 
important ethnic, racial, and regional differences—it is fair to say that Europe is more 
heterogeneous (at least regionally) than the United States. In comparative studies, it has often 
been argued that European countries can be rated on a continuum from more traditional societies 
such as Spain, Greece, and Italy on the one hand, to more modern and more economically 
developed societies such as Sweden and the Netherlands on the other (Hagenaars, Halman and 
Moors 2003). These differences are expressed in a number of social and cultural domains, 
including differences in marriage and family living. For example, in more traditional European 
societies, cohabitation and divorce are less common and less accepted, marriage has a higher 
social status, gender roles in marriage are more unequal, female labor force participation is 
lower, and extended family ties are stronger (Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Gelissen 
2003; Kalmijn 2003; Knudsen and Waerness 2008; Reher 1998). These indicators are strongly 
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correlated, both with each other and with the level of economic development in a country (GDP). 
This degree of heterogeneity suggests that Oppenheimer’s theory may not apply equally to all 
European countries. For example, in contexts where gender roles are more egalitarian, men’s 
economic situation could be less important for the entry into marriage and cohabitation. In these 
settings, men are not the only breadwinners and women’s economic resources should be of 
growing importance, making men’s economic resources less important. 
What has the evidence in Europe shown so far? Perhaps the most important source of 
evidence comes from a large multi-nation project initiated by the German sociologist Blossfeld 
and his colleagues (Blossfeld et al. 2005). In this project, Blossfeld brought together a number of 
demographers and sociologists from different parts of the world (with an overrepresentation of 
European countries), with the aim of examining the effect of men and women’s individual 
economic resources on the timing of marriage and parenthood. While the authors used their own 
country-specific longitudinal data, they used similar methods and variables, leading to a 
reasonably uniform and comparable set of outcomes. The project’s goal was to test the exact 
same set of hypotheses in each country. The hypotheses were borrowed in part from 
Oppenheimer’s work but they were translated by Mills and Blossfeld to make them fit for a 
broader societal setting (Mills and Blossfeld 2005). The papers were combined in a volume for 
which Oppenheimer wrote the foreword (Blossfeld et al. 2005).  
The papers in Blossfeld’s volume provide generally positive evidence for the theory in 
the European countries studied (Germany, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Hungary, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Spain). In virtually all countries, school enrolment—one of the indicators of 
uncertainty—negatively affected the entry into marriage. More importantly, men’s 
unemployment appeared to lower the chances of entering marriage in most countries (Bernardi 
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and Nazio 2005; Kieffer, Marry, Meron and Solaz 2005; Kurz, Steinhage and Golsch 2005; 
Liefbroer 2005; Noguera, Castro Martin and Bonmati 2005; Robert and Bukodi 2005). In 
Britain, an effect of unemployment was observed only on the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage, and not on the transition from being single to living together (Francesconi and Golsch 
2005). In Sweden, only unemployment after leaving school appeared to delay marriage 
formation, not unemployment after a period of employment (Bygren, Duvander and Hultin 
2005). Some evidence was also found for the effect of temporary contracts. In Italy, Spain, 
France, and the Netherlands, it was shown that men who were employed temporarily were less 
likely to enter marriage than men who had permanent employment. In Germany and Hungary, 
there was no effect of temporary work, however, and in several other countries, the effect could 
not be studied. A recent analyses of fertility in Europe has also pointed to the delaying effect of 
temporary contracts (Adsera 2011). 
Outside the Blossfeld project, there were a number of important individual papers in 
which aspects of Oppenheimer’s theory were tested. For example, in Sweden, it was found that 
men’s employment increased the chances of union formation while it did not affect the chances 
of marriage after cohabitation (Bracher and Santow 1998). In Norway, men’s employment 
increased the chances of marrying after being single and the chance of marrying after living 
together (Kravdal 1999). In the Netherlands, men’s employment had a stronger effect on direct 
marriage than on cohabitation but there was no effect of employment on marriage after 
cohabitation (Kalmijn and Luijkx 2005; cf. Liefbroer 2005). Evidence outside Europe (i.e., 
Israel) has been supportive as well (Raz-Yurovich 2010), as has been evidence in Central and 
Eastern Europe, a region not included in the present paper (Gerber and Berman 2010; . 
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While the role of employment has often been studied in Europe, less is known about how 
men’s income and earnings affect union formation. Many of the studies discussed above were 
based on retrospective rather than prospective longitudinal data. There are few good sources of 
large-scale panel data in Europe. Such data that exist have been collected by economists and 
labor market researchers and do not always have the desirable demographic indicators. Because 
income cannot be measured well in a retrospective fashion, this has also meant that we know 
little about income effects on marriage and divorce in Europe. This is unfortunate because 
employment and income need to be examined simultaneously, especially if one wants to make a 
distinction between the neo-Malthusian breadwinner hypothesis on the one hand, and 
Oppenheimer’s uncertainty hypothesis on the other. Because in many European welfare states 
nonemployment does not, per se, mean no income, these two factors are not perfectly correlated. 
Another drawback of the prevailing evidence is that most studies are based on single 
countries. Blossfeld’s multi-nation project is clearly a major step forward in trying to summarize 
the evidence for Europe as a whole, but the analyses are not pooled so the results can only be 
summarized verbally. Moreover, possible differences that exist between countries can be 
described but they cannot be compared or tested in a more rigorous fashion. For these reasons, 
there still is work to be done. 
 In the remainder of this paper, I address the following research questions. First, to what 
extent does men’s economic position affect union formation? In answering this question, I not 
only look at employment, I also look at men's income, work experience, and type of labor 
contract. By looking at income and employment patterns simultaneously, I obtain more direct 
evidence on the underlying mechanisms. The period for which I answer this question is 1994-
2004. In virtually all European countries, unemployment rates increased substantially in the early 
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1990s before declining again in the mid- to late 1990s (OECD 2009). In Italy, Greece and 
Belgium, unemployment remained high in the late 1990s but began to decline later, in the early 
2000s. In other words, for most countries, the period that I examine covers a recovery stage of 
the economy, a stage which should have been positive for marriage and family formation.  
Second, are the effects of men’s economic position similar or different for the chances of 
entering marriage and the chances of entering a cohabiting union? With this part of the study, I 
replicate the last influential work of Oppenheimer (2003), in which she studied this issue for the 
United States. We would expect effects to be weaker for cohabitation than for marriage: 
marriage would require a stronger economic underpinning than cohabitation (Kravdal 1999; 
Oppenheimer 2003). In addition, I examine the chances that cohabiting unions turn into 
marriage. Here too, Oppenheimer expects men’s economic position to have an effect, but 
because those who cohabit already have an independent household, the effects of income will 
probably be weaker. 
Third, to what extent are the effects of men’s economic position on union formation 
different across societal contexts? In this part, I focus on differences between traditional and 
egalitarian societies. The expectation is that men’s economic characteristics remain important in 
traditional societies but are less important in more modern, egalitarian ones. By looking at 
differences among societal contexts, I try to generalize the cross-cohort comparison that 
Sweeney (2002) made for the US. Answering this question is also of more general importance 
because if we find conditions under which the theory is (not) true, this could in principle lead to 
theoretical progress in the field.  
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Data, methods, and variables 
 
I use panel data that are collected in the same format for a number of European countries, i.e., the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP was an annual panel survey held 
between 1994 and 2001 (Behr, Bellgardt and Rendtel 2005; Clémenceau and Verma 1996). 
Samples are large and representative and (almost) the same questionnaire was used each year. 
For the analyses in this paper, I use data from 13 countries: Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
and Greece. My sample is limited to men who were never married in the first wave of the panel. 
Hence, I look at first union formation. Although I am able to exclude previously married men, I 
cannot exclude men who ended a cohabiting union before the panel began. Never married men 
who were cohabiting in the first wave are also included because these men can make the 
transition from cohabitation to marriage. The first wave of data from the Netherlands is excluded 
because no information is available on cohabitation status. The total number of men is 17,743. 
There have been previous demographic analyses of the ECHP, most notably that by 
Adsera (2011) who analyzes the role of individual and aggregate labor market characteristics on 
fertility. Although Adsera focused more on women than on men, her general conclusion is that 
labor market uncertainty is very influential in delaying fertility, in line with the perspective 
suggested above. In the current paper, we go back one step by analyzing how labor market 
uncertainty affects union formation, a transition which probably remains the most important 
necessary condition for family formation. We also focus explicitly on men. 
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Dependent variables and models 
 
I use discrete time event-history analysis by estimating logistic regression models on a person-
year file. The person-year file begins at the first wave and ends in the last wave or when a 
transition is made. As is the case with all event-history analyses of panel data, some men were 
already married in the first wave. Such left truncation problems can be solved in principle, but 
not without offering our time-varying independent variables (Guo 1993). The first logit model is 
estimated for person-years in which men are single and never married. The dependent variable is 
whether a man is living without a partner in wave t and living with a partner in wave t + 1 (union 
formation). In the second logit model, I estimated which choice was made, cohabitation or 
marriage, using only the person-years in which the event occurred. This sequential approach is 
slightly different from the approach taken by Oppenheimer, who estimated multinomial logit 
(i.e., competing risk) models (2003). The sequential approach does not need the assumption 
implicit in a competing risk model that the two choices—cohabitation and marriage—are 
independent of each other. This assumption is problematic because it is plausible that 
unmeasured factors like personality, wealth, attractiveness, and the like, influence marriage and 
cohabitation to the same extent (Hill, Axinn and Thornton 1993). If a person is single in year t, 
missing in year t + 1, and married or cohabiting in year t + 2, I also regarded this as an event. 
Duration dependency is modeled with two age effects, following the approach developed by 
Blossfeld and Huinink (1991). Blossfeld used log (age – a1) and log (a2 – age) to capture the 
nonlinear age-dependency of union formation, where a1 is the lowest and a2 the highest age in 
the sample. There were 4,492 transitions to a first union of which 2,499 were to cohabitation and 
1,993 to marriage. 
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 The second logit model is estimated for person-years in which men were living with a 
partner without being married. The dependent variable is defined as living with a partner 
unmarried in wave t and being married in wave t + 1 (marriage after cohabitation). Respondents 
who were living alone in wave t + 1 are truncated. Hence, separation is treated as a competing 
risk. If a person is cohabiting in year t, not in the panel in year t + 1, and married in year t + 2, I 
also regarded this as an event. Duration dependency could not be modeled directly because for 
those who are in a cohabitating union in the first wave of the panel, no data on the start of the 
union is available. As an alternative, I use age as a proxy. Age is obviously less ideal than 
duration since persons enter a cohabiting union at different ages. There were 1,498 transitions 
from cohabitation to marriage. Note that there was no question in the interview about whether 
the partner in one wave was the same partner as in the previous wave. Hence, I could not check 
if a man changed (cohabiting) partners between subsequent waves, nor could I check if the 
married partner was the same person as the cohabiting partner in the previous wave. 
 
Independent variables 
 
All independent variables, except where noted, refer to time t. Because the dependent variables 
refer to whether or not a transition was made between time t and t+1, the independent variables 
precede the dependent variable in time. Employment is measured with two dummy variables. 
The first indicates if a man is working on a paid job or is self-employed at the time of the 
interview for at least 15 hours a week. The second variable indicates other less common forms of 
employment, such as military service, apprenticeships, unpaid family work, and working less 
than 15 hours. Given that a man is employed, I also considered the type of contract he has. 
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Temporary contracts include fixed-term or short-term contracts, casual work with no contract, 
and ‘some other working arrangement’ that is not a permanent contract (all included within the 
15+ hours category). The coding is cumulative so that the effect of temporary work refers to the 
difference between men with a temporary contract and men with a permanent contract. I also 
include whether a person is enrolled in full-time schooling in the interview week.  
Next to a man’s current situation, I consider his work history. Data on work history are 
obtained from a monthly calendar that all respondents had to fill out. For the year t – 1, I counted 
the number of months that a man was employed, self-employed, or in school (hereafter called 
‘active’). This variable is not available in the Netherlands. Means were imputed and a dummy-
variable for the Netherlands is included. I checked whether the effects of this variable were 
different when excluding the Netherlands but this was not the case. 
Income is the other main variable of interest. I consider personal income and not only 
income from work since social security income may also provide a stable source of income. 
Ideally we would like to measure the income a man had in the interview month or in the 12 
months before the interview. Unfortunately, incomes are measured for (full) calendar years only. 
To solve this, I took a weighted average of the income in calendar year t-1 and the income in 
calendar year t, using information on the month of interview. For example, if the interview was 
in September 1994, income for that person-year is 9/12 of the income earned in 1994 plus 3/12 
of the income earned in 1993. Note that some of the income in year t may be earned after a man 
marries. The weights are also addressing this problem. Marrying in the year of the interview is 
more likely when the interview took place early in the year, but then, this income receives a 
lower weight. I corrected all incomes for changes in the Consumer Price Index and converted 
them to pounds sterling. To estimate effects of income in a comparable way across countries, I 
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used a relative income measure. I first calculated income quintiles in each country using data 
from all men in the first wave of the ECHP. Next, I used these quintiles to categorize the men in 
the person-year file. I also use a linear income variable which is coded 1-5 for the five quintiles. 
Three control variables are used which may affect union formation: general health (time 
varying), the highest level of educational attainment, and the year of the interview (using 
dummies). Health is controlled because having a poor health may be detrimental for finding a 
partner and is also related to job and income opportunities (Waldron, Hughes and Brooks 1996). 
Descriptive findings for the independent variables for each country are presented in Table 1. 
To explore differences across societies, I constructed two measures at the macro level. 
First, I considered a measure of the division of household labor in marriage in a society. This 
measure was obtained from a paper by Knudsen and Waerness (2008) and measures the extent to 
which husbands and wives share four household tasks (i.e., laundry, grocery shopping, meal 
preparation, caring for sick family members). The second measure is the female labor force 
participation rate in the 1990s, which is defined as the percentage of women aged 20-49 who are 
active in the labour force (obtained from ILO, Geneva). The two macro-level indicators are 
strongly correlated. Countries in which wives participate more often in the labor force are also 
countries in which the household tasks are divided more equally (r = .74). The most traditional 
societies are Southern European countries, the most egalitarian are Northern European countries. 
Western European countries are located in between these two. I construct a single macro-level 
indicator, which is means of the two standardized items. The scale is also standardized. 
 
Results 
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We start with some descriptive results. Figure 1 shows that there are small differences within 
Europe in the age at first union entry. In most countries, the mean age at entry is between 27-29. 
Male age at entry is low in Portugal and Austria, and high in the Netherlands and Italy. The 
differences do not coincide with a modern-traditional continuum. For example, the age at union 
formation is quite high in Italy and Greece where the family is a strong institution. This already 
points to the potential importance of unemployment. In Southern Europe, youth unemployment 
is high. When we look at the type of first union chosen by men, presented in the left side of 
Figure 1, we see clearer differences. In Western Europe, and even more in Northern Europe, 
direct marriage is a minority experience. In many countries, more than 80% of men cohabit first. 
In Southern Europe, the proportions are almost reversed: 60-80% of the men in these countries 
marry directly. The UK resembles Western Europe but Ireland resembles the south, with most 
men choosing marriage as their first way to enter a union. This most likely reflects the role of the 
Catholic church in Ireland. 
The effects of men’s economic characteristics on union entry are presented in Table 2. 
We discuss Model A first, which includes employment variables but no income variables. We 
note the important role of employment. The odds of entering a union are 58% higher for 
employed men than for men who are not employed and not in school (e 
.457
). Interestingly, there 
is also an effect on the type of union. Employed men have a 48% higher odds of marrying rather 
than cohabiting. Hence, nonemployment is less incompatible with cohabitation than with 
marriage. The type of labor contract also matters for the choice between marriage and 
cohabitation. Compared to men with a permanent job, men with a temporary job who enter a 
union are 23% less likely to choose marriage than cohabitation. We also note that school 
enrolment has a negative effect on male union entry while it does not affect the type of union. 
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Next to the effects of current employment characteristics, we see effects of men’s work 
history. The more months men were employed or otherwise active in the past calendar year, the 
more likely they are to enter a union in the next two calendar years. The magnitude of the effect 
is considerable. Men who were active for an entire year were e 
12 x .022 
= 30% more likely to enter 
a union in the next two years than men who were inactive the entire year. This effect comes on 
top of the effect of a man’s current employment situation. There is no effect of work history on 
the choice between marriage and cohabitation. 
In sum, the findings from Model A and Model D confirm that men who are not yet settled 
in their career postpone union formation. The findings also confirm that cohabitation is less 
sensitive to economic insecurity than marriage, although this applies more to employment per se 
and the type of employment than to a man’s work history. 
 In Model B and Model E, we add income variables to the model. We see that income has 
a strong effect on union entry. The reference group is the middle quintile. Each higher income 
group has a higher chance of entering a union. The poorest quintile of men are 45% less likely to 
enter a union than the middle quintile, while the richest quintile are 44% more likely to do so. 
The income effects increase monotonically but the differences between quintiles become smaller 
at higher income levels. A formal test shows that the effect is not strictly linear: The nonlinear 
model for union formation (Model B) has a better fit than the linear model (Model C, Chi-square 
= 9.3, p = .03). When we look at the income effect on the choice between marriage and 
cohabitation, we only see one marginally significant effect. Men in the lowest quintile who enter 
a union are 31% more likely than the middle quintile to choose cohabitation rather than marriage 
(p = .054). This result seems to confirm the notion of cohabitation as the poor man’s marriage, 
although the poor are still more likely not to enter a union in the first place. 
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When we compare the two models for union entry (Model A and B), the employment 
effects that we observed in Model A are reduced by more than half once income is added to the 
model. In other words, the effects of employment and work history run in part via income. 
Nevertheless, the employment effect remains statistically significant even when income is 
included, which means that the influence of employment on union formation also has a non-
financial element. This latter finding is in line with Oppenheimer’s uncertainty argument. It is 
also interesting to observe that the effects of employment and temporary jobs on the choice 
between marriage and cohabitation are not affected by whether or not income is added (compare 
Model D and E). This is logical, given the weaker income effect on this outcome. Hence, the 
non-financial aspects of work are more important for the type of union than for the chance of 
entering a union in the first place. In this sense, Oppenheimer’s uncertainty theory seems to work 
better for the type of union than for union formation per se. 
 Several of the control variables also have an effect. Men in good health are more likely to 
enter a union. Moreover, men in good health more often choose marriage than cohabitation. This 
confirms theories about selection into marriage and suggests that screening or selection may be 
less strong for cohabitation. Education, finally, has a positive effect on union entry but these 
effects are reduced when income is controlled for. 
 In the last columns of Table 2, we focus on marriage formation after cohabitation (Model 
G, H, and I). We see that it is not affected by employment, but being enrolled in school does 
reduce the chance of marrying. We also find that men who worked more months in the past are 
more likely to marry. Income also has a significant effect. The higher the men’s income during 
cohabitation, the more likely they are to change from cohabitation to marriage. When comparing 
the linear income effect on marriage after cohabitation with the linear effect on initial union 
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formation, it appears that income is less important for marriage after cohabitation (b = .10) than 
it is for union formation after being single (b = .21). This is in line with the neo-Malthusian 
hypothesis, which suggests that it is primarily for initial union entry that the costs of setting up a 
household play a role (although the wedding is a cost factor which applies specifically to 
marriage). 
 The control variables also have effects on the transition to marriage. Men in good health 
are more likely to experience a transition from cohabitation to marriage, suggesting that selection 
effects also play a role in the decision to marry, not only in the decision to live together. We also 
see that higher educated cohabiting men are more likely to marry, hence, for the higher educated, 
cohabitation is less often seen as a long-term option. This effect is not explained by income. 
Do the effects we found vary across societal contexts? To assess this, I present interaction 
effects of key independent variables with the macro-level indicator of traditional versus 
egalitarian societies. Interaction effects are presented in Table 3. The p-values are based on 
standard errors that are corrected for the clustering of cases within countries. This yields a more 
conservative test for macro-level effects and is a good alternative to multilevel models when the 
number of units at the macro level is limited. To check for outliers at the country level, I 
calculated DFBETAs for the interaction effects of modernization and employment, and of 
modernization and income, and re-estimated the models while leaving out countries for which 
DFBETAs exceeded the critical value (Kalmijn 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). DFBETA is 
calculated as the difference in an effect with and without the outlier divided by the standard error 
of the effect. These outlier analyses are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 3. 
In Table 3, we see a negative interaction of the societal index with men’s employment (b 
= -.16, p < .01). Hence, the average effect of employment (b = .50) is reduced by 32% for each 
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standard deviation increase in the egalitarian context (.16 / .50). This shows that the effect of 
men’s employment on the entry into a union is considerably weaker in more egalitarian countries 
than in more traditional countries. I also present the effects for each country separately in a graph 
(Figure 2). In this graph, the effect of selected independent variables is plotted against the macro-
level index. Although the graph does not provide a test, like the interaction effect, it does give a 
good intuitive feel of the importance of the interaction effect. In line with expectations, the graph 
shows that in more traditional societies like Spain, Italy, and Ireland, the effect of men’s 
employment is quite strong. In more egalitarian countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Finland, the effect is weaker although generally not zero. We see similar interaction effects of 
school enrolment and the societal index. Men’s enrolment in school deters union formation but 
this effect is weaker in more egalitarian societies. Both interaction effects are in line with the 
hypothesis. 
Table 3 further shows no negative interaction of the societal index with men’s income 
effect on union formation. After deleting two outliers (Italy and the UK), the interaction becomes 
negative and significant (b = -.037, p = .01). Hence, for these 11 countries, the effect of men’s 
income on union formation is weaker in more egalitarian countries than in more traditional 
countries. The magnitude of the effect is a 15% reduction in the income effect per standard 
deviation increase in the egalitarian context (.037 / .234). When we look at the graph, the pattern 
appears to be weaker than it was for employment. Spain and Portugal reveal strong effects of 
men’s income and Denmark and the Netherlands have weak effects. However, there are also 
outliers like the UK (stronger effect than expected) and Italy and Belgium (weaker effect than 
expected). 
So far, these results apply to union formation regardless of the type of union. Traditional 
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and egalitarian societies also differ in the extent to which cohabitation occurs. The more 
egalitarian countries like Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands also have the highest levels of 
cohabitation (Soons and Kalmijn 2009). Because the effects of men’s economic position differ 
depending on whether marriage or cohabitation is the outcome, the results could in part be due to 
such compositional differences. For this reason, I also look at the entry into marriage only (either 
after being single or after cohabitation). The interaction with employment is -.066 (p = .11), the 
interaction with enrolment is .326 (p < .01), and the interaction with income is -.073 (p = < .01). 
Hence, the employment interaction effect is weaker in this model, although still negative, while 
the other interaction effects are not affected. We therefore conclude that part of the reason why 
the employment effects depend on the context lies in the fact that unions are more often 
unmarried unions in more egalitarian societies. Even apart from that, however, there is evidence 
that men’s economic status matters more for marriage in more traditional societies. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
This paper has re-examined the importance of Oppenheimer’s theory on marriage timing in the 
European context. By and large, the European evidence supports the theory. Unemployment, 
little work experience, low income, and temporary employment on the part of men deter union 
formation. By analyzing income and employment effects simultaneously in a panel perspective, 
it was possible to obtain more direct evidence for the two contrasting hypotheses suggested by 
Oppenheimer , i.e., the neo-Malthusian male breadwinner hypothesis and the career uncertainty 
hypothesis (sometimes also called the career instability or immaturity hypothesis). Many 
previous European analyses have not been able to take income into account and have therefore 
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not been able to separate these two mechanisms empirically. 
My analyses first show that income effects are strong and significant, which supports the 
male breadwinner hypothesis. Second, the income effects explain about half of the effects of 
employment and work experience, suggesting that employment effects by themselves are not 
sufficient evidence for the uncertainty hypothesis. However, the employment effects do not 
completely disappear once income is added. This suggests that employment effects on union 
formation are more than just a matter of financial resources, in line with the uncertainty 
hypothesis. 
By analyzing the choice between cohabitation and marriage, further evidence could be 
obtained for the two hypotheses. Marriage in Europe appears to be more sensitive to men’s 
economic position than cohabitation. Men who are not employed or who have temporary jobs are 
more likely to choose cohabitation rather than marriage. This finding provides additional 
evidence for the uncertainty hypothesis since cohabitation is more like a trial marriage and 
hence, more compatible with uncertainty in other life domains (i.e., employment). We do not, 
however, see a clear income effect on the choice between marriage and cohabitation. Hence, the 
choice between marriage and cohabitation has more to do with employment uncertainty than 
with income. There is a small effect of the lowest income group, however.  Among men who 
enter a union, the 20% poorest men are more likely to choose cohabitation. Hence, there is some 
evidence that cohabitation is the ‘poor man’s marriage.’ 
Following Oppenheimer’s last work, I also examined the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage. We would expect economic uncertainty to also reduce the chances of a transition from 
cohabitation to marriage, but in general, the effects we find are weaker for this transition. The 
weaker income effect could be due to the fact that the cost of setting up a household plays no 
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role for this transition. Income also had little effect on the initial choice between marriage and 
cohabitation. While this is in line with the neo-Malthusian argument, the finding that the 
employment effects on the transition from cohabitation to marriage are also weaker is 
unexpected. Other authors have found this too (e.g., Bracher and Santow 1998, Liefbroer 2005). 
Future research is needed to find out why this is the case. One speculation is that fertility and 
housing play a role. If couples buy a house or have a child, they may decide to marry. Although 
such transitions may be partly governed by economic uncertainty, they may also be exogenous 
and hence reduce the effects of other determinants like employment. Another speculation has to 
do with the lack of information on the (female) partner. The partner may have become 
economically more secure during the cohabitation stage, thereby promoting the transition to 
marriage, but we do not observe such changes. 
European countries differ considerably in terms of their economic, social, and cultural 
characteristics, so it is important to also examine country variation in the degree to which the 
theory applies. We hypothesized that men’s economic position would be less influential in more 
developed countries where gender roles are more symmetrical. We find some evidence in 
support of this notion. The effects of men’s employment and school enrolment on union 
formation are stronger in more traditional societies than in more egalitarian ones. Income effects 
are also weaker in egalitarian societies but the evidence for this pattern is weaker. Our 
interpretation is that in egalitarian settings, the costs of setting up a household are more often 
shared between men and women. Hence, men can afford to experiment with their career if they 
have a partner who has a (more) stable career. Similarly, women may attach less weight to the 
career options of men than they did in more traditional circumstances and for instance, pay more 
attention to other traits, such as men’s willingness to participate in child rearing.  
 28 
My finding is in contrast to a previous cohort comparison for the US which suggested 
that men’s economic effects on marriage timing did not change over time (Sweeney 2002). 
Perhaps this difference is due to the limited time period that was examined in Sweeney’s trend 
study, a design which may have reduced the variance in contextual gender roles. At the same 
time, however, it needs to be investigated whether the patterns that I found still hold when a 
larger number of countries is considered. The income interaction effects, for example, are 
sensitive to outliers and therefore less convincing. More units at the macro-level will be needed 
to confirm this finding. 
In closing, it is important to re-emphasize the role of women. Although Oppenheimer 
was justifiably ‘bringing men back’ into the debate at a time when there was too little attention 
on the changing economic fate of young (American) men, the growing egalitarian model that is 
now supported by many couples in Europe and the United States, suggests that men and women 
should be examined simultaneously for a better understanding of trends and differentials in 
marriage and cohabitation. Traditionally, studies of women were largely done from a Beckerian 
perspective in which it was argued that women’s status would lead to a decline of marriage (and 
fertility). Currently, we can speculate that a strong economic position and career stability on the 
part of women might foster marriage. How this works from a couple perspective is not yet clear. 
It could be that certainty on just one side—either the man or the woman—is enough to make 
stronger union commitments. In this case, one career supports the other. Alternatively, it could 
be that both the man’s and the woman’s career need to have been settled before couples enter a 
more committed union. 
In this respect, it is somewhat unfortunate that analyses of marriage (timing or formation) 
have often been one-sided, focusing either on men or on women. This design is unavoidable 
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given that the partner of a respondent is typically observed too late, i.e., when the respondent is 
married or living with the partner. Empirically, this problem does not exist when we observe 
cohabiting couples’ chances of marrying. Some authors in the past have regarded the transition 
from cohabitation to marriage as a two-sided problem and have analyzed economic 
characteristics of both partners in one model (Lichter, Qian and Mellot 2006; Smock and 
Manning 1997). These studies have not been able to examine the more important entry into a 
first union, however. For this transition, the problem can, in principle, be solved by examining 
dating couples in a more systematic fashion. For example, prospective surveys could collect data 
on the school- and work careers of both members of a dating couple and subsequently analyze 
whether or not (and when) they begin to live together, while using the dissolution of the dating 
relationship as a competing risk. In this way, the analysis of marriage and cohabitation can 
become truly two-sided and the economic characteristics of men and women can be included in 
one model. There are some innovative sociological studies of transitions from dating to 
cohabitation and marriage, but so far, they have not focused on the partners' economic 
characteristics (Joyner and Kao 2005) 
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Figure 1.- Men's First Union Formation in 13 Countries 
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Figure 2.- Effects of Men’s Economic Characteristics on Union Entry 
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Table 1.-Means of independent variables in person-year file by country
Year (1-8) Age
General 
health (1-5)
Secondary 
education
Tertiary 
education
Working 
15+ hours
Other 
work
Tempo-
rary 
contract
Enrolled in 
school
Months 
active (0-
12)
Relative 
income (1-
5)
Income in 
pounds
UK (n = 7,585) 4.07 31.88 3.91 0.08 0.68 0.75 0.03 0.05 0.05 9.94 3.04 10546
Ireland (n = 7,741) 3.40 32.31 4.37 0.44 0.23 0.62 0.05 0.08 0.12 9.52 2.70 7184
Germany (n = 9,581) 4.06 30.12 3.79 0.64 0.26 0.68 0.09 0.07 0.12 10.41 2.55 9536
Austria (n = 5,782) 4.48 29.12 4.40 0.79 0.08 0.70 0.08 0.06 0.13 10.67 2.50 8995
France (n = 11,385) 3.90 31.99 3.87 0.42 0.32 0.60 0.06 0.09 0.14 9.49 2.52 8537
Belgium (n = 3,842) 3.81 32.25 4.17 0.44 0.44 0.63 0.01 0.08 0.19 9.96 2.46 9182
Netherlands (n = 5,248) 4.52 32.66 4.11 0.54 0.22 0.73 0.03 0.10 0.14 9.00 2.44 9841
Italy (n = 18,316) 4.02 29.88 4.11 0.52 0.14 0.53 0.06 0.07 0.17 8.55 2.49 4696
Greece (n = 7,942) 3.89 29.64 4.69 0.47 0.28 0.61 0.11 0.12 0.11 9.57 2.57 4220
Spain (n = 12,764) 3.83 30.83 4.08 0.25 0.39 0.55 0.04 0.20 0.16 8.68 2.54 4553
Portugal (n = 10,097) 4.09 29.42 3.69 0.22 0.11 0.68 0.04 0.15 0.12 10.06 2.88 3062
Finland (n = 5,360) 5.01 32.95 4.06 0.56 0.26 0.61 0.04 0.09 0.17 9.45 2.55 11526
Denmark (n = 5,381) 3.88 33.38 4.42 0.45 0.40 0.71 0.06 0.08 0.11 10.20 2.99 12814
Total (n = 111,024) 4.03 30.97 4.09 0.43 0.28 0.63 0.06 0.10 0.13 9.50 2.62 7227
Source: ECHP (own calculations).
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Union formation Marriage vs cohabitation Marriage after cohabitation
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H Model I
Ln (age - 15) 0.841*** 0.661*** 0.676*** 0.746*** 0.745*** 0.741*** -0.230* -0.317** -0.316**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln (65 - age) 1.872*** 1.816*** 1.847*** 0.810*** 0.813*** 0.809*** 0.296* 0.264 0.268
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.061) (0.058)
General health 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.135* 0.135* 0.135* 0.107** 0.104* 0.103*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Education secondary 0.029 -0.002 -0.007 -0.046 -0.035 -0.047 0.005 -0.012 -0.014
  versus primary (0.491) (0.955) (0.867) (0.655) (0.731) (0.648) (0.951) (0.890) (0.873)
Education tertiary 0.225*** 0.141** 0.122** 0.113 0.149 0.111 0.408*** 0.361*** 0.349***
  versus primary (0.000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.311) (0.194) (0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working 15+ hours 0.457*** 0.193** 0.220*** 0.450** 0.419** 0.445** 0.178 0.090 0.102
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.166) (0.495) (0.434)
Other employed 0.144 0.204* 0.188* 0.279 0.350 0.282 0.237 0.250 0.245
  versus no work/school (0.088) (0.016) (0.026) (0.176) (0.096) (0.173) (0.277) (0.254) (0.263)
Temporary versus -0.067 0.026 0.031 -0.253* -0.262* -0.251* -0.120 -0.086 -0.090
 fixed contract (0.182) (0.609) (0.544) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) (0.249) (0.410) (0.386)
In school versus no -0.623*** -0.431*** -0.468*** -0.180 -0.089 -0.173 -0.515* -0.410 -0.424*
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.388) (0.679) (0.412) (0.015) (0.059) (0.046)
Months worked 0.022*** 0.006 0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 0.031* 0.021 0.023
 last 2 years (0.000) (0.243) (0.178) (0.518) (0.405) (0.504) (0.010) (0.089) (0.066)
First income quintile -0.604*** -0.272 -0.256*
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.054) (0.044)
Second income quintile -0.253*** -0.039 -0.182*
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.735) (0.037)
Fourth income quintile 0.232*** -0.136 0.094
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.210) (0.224)
Fifth income quintile 0.366*** -0.127 0.109
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.328) (0.233)
Linear income 0.239*** 0.007 0.098***
 (1-5) (0.000) (0.861) (0.001)
Constant -11.814***-10.677***-11.595***-7.903*** -7.789*** -7.895*** -3.346*** -2.771*** -3.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 77621 77621 77621 4472 4472 4472 11678 11678 11678
Chi-square 2240 2460 2451 1625 1630 1625 335 348 346
Note: Controlled for country and year dummy's.
* p < .05, * p < .01, * p < .001.
Table 2.-Discrete time event history models of union formation: logit regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses
 
 
NB! Production department: please replace "dummy's" with "dummies"  
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Model A 
all cases
Model B 
all cases
Model A 
w/o 
outliers
Model B 
w/o 
outliers
Ln (age - 15) 0.953*** 0.781** 0.943*** 0.686*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.036)
Ln (65 - age) 1.970*** 1.956*** 1.934*** 2.040*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010)
General health 0.121** 0.107** 0.102** 0.119*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.016)
Education secondary 0.071 0.023 0.031 0.115
  versus primary (0.287) (0.732) (0.638) (0.079)
Education tertiary 0.271*** 0.152* 0.248*** 0.224***
  versus primary (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001)
Working 15+ hours 0.501*** 0.194*** 0.549*** 0.175***
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In school versus no -0.672*** -0.604*** -0.614*** -0.673***
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income linear 0.242*** 0.243***
(0.000) (0.000)
Index (traditional 1.916 2.075 2.092 2.039
 - egalitarian) (0.177) (0.144) (0.262) (0.327)
Index * -0.278 -0.314* -0.311 -0.217
 ln (age - 15) (0.058) (0.037) (0.110) (0.272)
Index * -0.233 -0.262 -0.288 -0.309
 ln (65 - age) (0.442) (0.386) (0.471) (0.485)
Index * health -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(0.914) (0.872) (0.718) (0.897)
Index * secondary 0.079 0.087 0.086 0.121*
 education (0.333) (0.285) (0.368) (0.041)
Index * tertiary 0.119 0.130 0.139 0.205***
 education (0.106) (0.079) (0.127) (0.000)
Index * working -0.158** -0.122** -0.152*** -0.098*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.043)
Index * enrolled 0.236** 0.210** 0.215** 0.288***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
Index * income 0.002 -0.037**
(0.935) (0.008)
Constant -13.107***-12.953***-12.853*** -13.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 77621 77621 68837 58354
* p < .05, * p < .01, * p < .001.
Note: Controlled for country and year dummy's. P-values corrected for clustering. 
Outliers for Model A are Denmark and Greece, for Model B these are Italy and the UK.
Table 3.-Discrete time event history models of union formation with interactions: logit 
regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses
 
 
NB! Production department: please replace "dummy's" with "dummies"  
Figure 1.- Men's First Union Formation in 13 Countries 
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Figure 2.- Effects of Men’s Economic Characteristics on Union Entry 
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Table 1.-Means of independent variables in person-year file by country
Year (1-8) Age
General 
health (1-5)
Secondary 
education
Tertiary 
education
Working 
15+ hours
Other 
work
Tempo-
rary 
contract
Enrolled in 
school
Months 
active (0-
12)
Relative 
income (1-
5)
Income in 
pounds
UK (n = 7,585) 4.07 31.88 3.91 0.08 0.68 0.75 0.03 0.05 0.05 9.94 3.04 10546
Ireland (n = 7,741) 3.40 32.31 4.37 0.44 0.23 0.62 0.05 0.08 0.12 9.52 2.70 7184
Germany (n = 9,581) 4.06 30.12 3.79 0.64 0.26 0.68 0.09 0.07 0.12 10.41 2.55 9536
Austria (n = 5,782) 4.48 29.12 4.40 0.79 0.08 0.70 0.08 0.06 0.13 10.67 2.50 8995
France (n = 11,385) 3.90 31.99 3.87 0.42 0.32 0.60 0.06 0.09 0.14 9.49 2.52 8537
Belgium (n = 3,842) 3.81 32.25 4.17 0.44 0.44 0.63 0.01 0.08 0.19 9.96 2.46 9182
Netherlands (n = 5,248) 4.52 32.66 4.11 0.54 0.22 0.73 0.03 0.10 0.14 9.00 2.44 9841
Italy (n = 18,316) 4.02 29.88 4.11 0.52 0.14 0.53 0.06 0.07 0.17 8.55 2.49 4696
Greece (n = 7,942) 3.89 29.64 4.69 0.47 0.28 0.61 0.11 0.12 0.11 9.57 2.57 4220
Spain (n = 12,764) 3.83 30.83 4.08 0.25 0.39 0.55 0.04 0.20 0.16 8.68 2.54 4553
Portugal (n = 10,097) 4.09 29.42 3.69 0.22 0.11 0.68 0.04 0.15 0.12 10.06 2.88 3062
Finland (n = 5,360) 5.01 32.95 4.06 0.56 0.26 0.61 0.04 0.09 0.17 9.45 2.55 11526
Denmark (n = 5,381) 3.88 33.38 4.42 0.45 0.40 0.71 0.06 0.08 0.11 10.20 2.99 12814
Total (n = 111,024) 4.03 30.97 4.09 0.43 0.28 0.63 0.06 0.10 0.13 9.50 2.62 7227
Source: ECHP (own calculations).
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Union formation Marriage vs cohabitation Marriage after cohabitation
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H Model I
Ln (age - 15) 0.841*** 0.661*** 0.676*** 0.746*** 0.745*** 0.741*** -0.230* -0.317** -0.316**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln (65 - age) 1.872*** 1.816*** 1.847*** 0.810*** 0.813*** 0.809*** 0.296* 0.264 0.268
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.061) (0.058)
General health 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.135* 0.135* 0.135* 0.107** 0.104* 0.103*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Education secondary 0.029 -0.002 -0.007 -0.046 -0.035 -0.047 0.005 -0.012 -0.014
  versus primary (0.491) (0.955) (0.867) (0.655) (0.731) (0.648) (0.951) (0.890) (0.873)
Education tertiary 0.225*** 0.141** 0.122** 0.113 0.149 0.111 0.408*** 0.361*** 0.349***
  versus primary (0.000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.311) (0.194) (0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working 15+ hours 0.457*** 0.193** 0.220*** 0.450** 0.419** 0.445** 0.178 0.090 0.102
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.166) (0.495) (0.434)
Other employed 0.144 0.204* 0.188* 0.279 0.350 0.282 0.237 0.250 0.245
  versus no work/school (0.088) (0.016) (0.026) (0.176) (0.096) (0.173) (0.277) (0.254) (0.263)
Temporary versus -0.067 0.026 0.031 -0.253* -0.262* -0.251* -0.120 -0.086 -0.090
 fixed contract (0.182) (0.609) (0.544) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) (0.249) (0.410) (0.386)
In school versus no -0.623*** -0.431*** -0.468*** -0.180 -0.089 -0.173 -0.515* -0.410 -0.424*
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.388) (0.679) (0.412) (0.015) (0.059) (0.046)
Months worked 0.022*** 0.006 0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 0.031* 0.021 0.023
 last 2 years (0.000) (0.243) (0.178) (0.518) (0.405) (0.504) (0.010) (0.089) (0.066)
First income quintile -0.604*** -0.272 -0.256*
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.054) (0.044)
Second income quintile -0.253*** -0.039 -0.182*
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.735) (0.037)
Fourth income quintile 0.232*** -0.136 0.094
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.210) (0.224)
Fifth income quintile 0.366*** -0.127 0.109
  versus third quintile (0.000) (0.328) (0.233)
Linear income 0.239*** 0.007 0.098***
 (1-5) (0.000) (0.861) (0.001)
Constant -11.814***-10.677***-11.595***-7.903*** -7.789*** -7.895*** -3.346*** -2.771*** -3.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 77621 77621 77621 4472 4472 4472 11678 11678 11678
Chi-square 2240 2460 2451 1625 1630 1625 335 348 346
Note: Controlled for country and year dummy's.
* p < .05, * p < .01, * p < .001.
Table 2.-Discrete time event history models of union formation: logit regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses
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Model A 
all cases
Model B 
all cases
Model A 
w/o 
outliers
Model B 
w/o 
outliers
Ln (age - 15) 0.953*** 0.781** 0.943*** 0.686*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.036)
Ln (65 - age) 1.970*** 1.956*** 1.934*** 2.040*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010)
General health 0.121** 0.107** 0.102** 0.119*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.016)
Education secondary 0.071 0.023 0.031 0.115
  versus primary (0.287) (0.732) (0.638) (0.079)
Education tertiary 0.271*** 0.152* 0.248*** 0.224***
  versus primary (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001)
Working 15+ hours 0.501*** 0.194*** 0.549*** 0.175***
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In school versus no -0.672*** -0.604*** -0.614*** -0.673***
  versus no work/school (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.15226
Income linear 0.242*** 0.243***
(0.000) (0.000)
Index (traditional 1.916 2.075 2.092 2.039
 - egalitarian) (0.177) (0.144) (0.262) (0.327)
Index * -0.278 -0.314* -0.311 -0.217
 ln (age - 15) (0.058) (0.037) (0.110) (0.272)
Index * -0.233 -0.262 -0.288 -0.309
 ln (65 - age) (0.442) (0.386) (0.471) (0.485)
Index * health -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(0.914) (0.872) (0.718) (0.897)
Index * secondary 0.079 0.087 0.086 0.121*
 education (0.333) (0.285) (0.368) (0.041)
Index * tertiary 0.119 0.130 0.139 0.205***
 education (0.106) (0.079) (0.127) (0.000)
Index * working -0.158** -0.122** -0.152*** -0.098*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.043)
Index * enrolled 0.236** 0.210** 0.215** 0.288***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
Index * income 0.002 -0.037**
(0.935) (0.008)
Constant -13.107***-12.953***-12.853*** -13.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 77621 77621 68837 58354
* p < .05, * p < .01, * p < .001.
Note: Controlled for country and year dummy's. P-values corrected for clustering. 
Outliers for Model A are Denmark and Greece, for Model B these are Italy and the UK.
Table 3.-Discrete time event history models of union formation with interactions: logit 
regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses
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